This paper supersedes all previous versions, including: A disagreement theory of bargaining , Endogenous bargaining power and Why do lions get the lion s share?: A Hobbesian theory of agreements .
disagreement function, which maps each set of feasible outcomes into a disagreement point. Adding this function to the description of a bargaining problem, a weak axiom based on individual rationality leads to a unique solution: the agreement in the shadow of con ict, ASC. This agreement may be construed as the limit of a sequence of partial agreements, each of which is reached as a function of the parties relative power in the disagreement scenario. We provide a non-cooperative implementation as well.
Bargaining, con ict, disagreement.
: C78, D74.
«The rich get the law passed by means of force and arms or get it accepted by fear to their might, aren t things this way?» Plato, Republic.
Standard bargaining theory arrives at solutions in two steps. The rst step consists in the reduction of a bargaining situation into the con nes of a , de ned by Nash (1950) as the set of feasible utility allocations and the threat point . The latter is meant to be the outcome of some (presumably) wasteful interaction that follows disagreement. Thus, different disagreement games re ecting altered distributions of power among the players are summarized as different threat points.
The second step which has concentrated the efforts of bargaining theory proper so far consists in selecting a solution to this simpli ed problem. The solution to this second step is based on either a set of plausible axioms or on the outcome of a posited extensive-form game that is completely independent from the one which determines the disagreement point. This game might admit differential bargaining power among the agents, as in the generalized Nash solution. But the essential 
disagreement function extended bargaining problem
Note that this additional information was already required for the determination of in the standard context, since the knowledge of the game is necessary to nd its equilibrium. Once the game is well de ned, it is straightforward to calculate its equilibria under different hypothetical . point is that current bargaining theory establishes no link between the power of the players in the rst step determining and in the second step, when xing the shares of the surplus over and above . Our paper is an attempt at integrating these two steps in a consistent manner.
Speci cally, we claim that the differential power of the players in the underlying non-cooperative game supporting the disagreement point also in uences the bargaining process itself and, in fact, it actually determines its solution. In order to capture the differential power in the non-cooperative game we need more information on the disagreement game than just the equilibrium payoffs. We need a reduced-form description of the disagreement game itself. As it turns out, all the relevant information can be summarized by the speci cation of how the outcome of con ict, , varies as a function of the stakes, . This is the game-speci c , , which maps sets of payoffs into the corresponding equilibrium of the disagreement game. An is thus described by a pair : the set of the payoffs initially available and the disagreement function providing the outcome of disagreement for any subset of these payoffs. We wish to stress that the disagreement function is NOT freely chosen by the modeler, rather it forms part of the description of a bargaining situation and therefore it is exogenously given.
The nature of the disagreement game depends on the problem at hand. In some situations, it is so rudimentary that players do not even have a choice over alternative strategies. Consider, for instance, bargaining over the price of an object in the middle of a bazaar. If the players do not reach an agreement, the potential buyer walks out and goes to the next shop. Thus, the disagreement payoffs are simply the outside options of the parties. However, such extremely simple situations agreement in the shadow of con ict seem the exception rather than the rule. In the previous case, it is essential that players terminate any future relationship after reaching disagreement. Whenever players do not cease to interact, the disagreement game is necessarily richer. Social relationships are of this type. The fact that we may fail to achieve a particular collective agreement simply means that the future relationship among agents will be non-cooperative. The same can be said of oligopolistic markets, industrial disputes, or simply of individuals litigating over a particular issue of their concern. This is also the case in the international arena, where one cannot modify who are one s neighbors.
For our purposes, the only condition we need the disagreement game/function to satisfy is that disagreement does not result in the loss of the entire surplus. That is, either the surplus should not be fully relationship speci c, or upon disagreement the players should continue the interaction and reach a non-negotiated settlement which does not destroy the full surplus. The key observation driving our result is that once we eliminate the individually non-rational agreements, the bargaining problem becomes a different one with a new bargaining set reduced to the remainder. Via the disagreement function, the new bargaining set yields a new threat point as well. Since our axiom applies to all bargaining problems, it also applies to this new (continuation) one, and further Note that we for our argument to work we need not assume that the bargaining set is de ned in utility space, it could be de ned directly in outcome space. Consequently it can be construed as an ordinal solution.
For example, the expected division ruled by the court may be 7:3, but the cost of the better lawyer is 5 while the cost of the worse one is only 2.
reduces the set of feasible agreements. Using our second axiom whic h only requires that the solution to a bargaining game should remain unaltered if we restart the bargaining game using the solution as the original bargaining set we show that the repeated application of the rst axiom to the resulting sequence of bargaining games converges to a situation where the disagreement outcome is efficient, thus pinpointing a unique solution.
To x ideas, consider the simple example of splitting an inheritance of, say, ten euros, between two siblings (who do not fancy each other). The siblings can either agree on a particular split at no cost, or disagree and engage in a costly dispute over the money. Suppose that, if players engaged in con ict, in equilibrium seven euros would be wasted (on, say, lawyers fees), while of the remaining three euros one player would expect to obtain two and the other one. This allocation may re ect the fact that, for instance, one s lawyer is twice as in uential as the other s. As a result of the expected outcome of con ict, any agreement must give to the siblings at least two and one euros, respectively. Recognizing this, they are willing to get to a partial agreement, which guarantees them these outside payoffs. Consequently, the effective area of dissent shrinks to the remaining seven euros, which are precisely the bene ts from cooperation. On the division of these seven euros the siblings may again either agree or disagree and engage in a dispute. In the dispute, say, four euros would be wasted and the strong sibling would obtain two and the weak one.
Notice that even if they disagree, both siblings are better off by respecting their partial agreement and restricting the dispute to the distribution of the seven euro surplus. It thus follows that any agreement must give to the siblings at least four and two euros, respectively. This observation generates a new partial agreement. Applying the argument repeatedly, we reach the nal agreement, where the ten euros are distributed according to the power of the parties in the con ict game:
20/3 and 10/3.
The argument above provides an attractive interpretation of negotiation as a where, driven by the fear of a con ictual resolution, the parties accept to gradually narrow down the extent of their dissent. Along each step of this process, it is the relative power of the players, as embodied in the disagreement function, what shapes the solution. We prove that for a very rich class of games, perfectly informed, rational agents will accept to reduce the area of their dissent completely:
they will reach an agreement.
As no theory of bargaining is complete without a non-cooperative implementation, we also exhibit an extensive form game, which (asymptotically) implements the ASC. This game is a nite horizon bargaining game with randomly selected proposers, where unanimity is required for agreement. We show that as the number of periods tends to in nity the unique expected subgame perfect outcome of the
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In contrast, both the Nash (1950) and the Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) solutions would predict that the seven-euro surplus over and above the (total) disagreement point would be brotherly shared by the two players. They would obtain 5.5 and 4.5 euros in total, respectively. This process may be an actual one or just a thought process, which directly leads the players to agreement. Indeed, we observe that even in the cases in which players do not reach agreement and go into playing the con ict game think of the extreme case of wars they do accept restricting its amplitude. Thus, countries accept not to bomb civilian targets or to abstain from the use of particularly harmful weapons. Likewise, plaintiffs may reach a pre-trial agreement still leaving part of the dispute unresolved. What keeps the con ict from escalation is the separation between the agreement and con ict games: not respecting a (partial) agreement is not a unilateral deviation in the con ict game; instead it is a unilateral deviation provoking a transition to the con ict game.
This way such a deviation is observable: the countries foresee each other s reaction to a unilateral deviation. For example, according to our solution, in a complete information Cournot model, two identical rms would each agree to produce half the monopoly quantity, which is indeed the optimal colluding outcome (for them). The Nash equilibrium would correspond to unrestricted con ict (that is, competition) in this case. 
Might and right in social agreements
See Taylor (1987) and Gauthier (1990) .
game converges to immediate agreement at the ASC.
We also clarify the connection between the ASC, the generalized Nash and the ments will, at least partly, re ect the distribution of power is to be expected as long as a social contract is to be found acceptable by all parties. Therefore, and this is one of Hobbes characteristic themes, we cannot develop a theory of social contracts without reference to the power of the parties in the non-cooperative scenario. The state of nature not only determines the size of the potential surplus to be shared, but also the shares themselves.
It is our opinion that standard bargaining theory has been driven to the use of normative axioms because the description of the bargaining problem was so stylized that there were no bases left for a positive derivation of the corresponding agreement. We develop a positive theory of agreements, adopting Hobbes p osition that takes the initial conditions as given and focuses on social agreements, quite independently of the moral judgement they might deserve. We reserve nor- Actually, for our analysis it is not necessary that preferences satisfy the von NeumannMorgenstern axioms. We could directly phrase our model in terms of money, prestige or the like.
We elaborate on this issue in the Conclusions. This solution maybe a unique Nash (subgame-perfect?) equilibrium, but uniqueness of equilibrium is not necessary. In case of multiplicity, the disagreement outcome can be de ned as the meet of the utilities gained at the different equilibria.
decessors of the more recent papers by Esteban and Ray (1999), Grossman (1991 Grossman ( , 1994 ), Grossman and Kim (1995) , Hirshleifer (1991 Hirshleifer ( , 1995 , Horowitz (1993) , and Skaperdas (1992) among many others. The common feature of all these models is that the opposition of interests is resolved via con ict. Players expend resources into trying to make their preferred option prevail. The equilibrium outcome entails waste of resources and the particular allocation reached critically depends on what is at stake as well as on the relative power, among other relevant characteristics, of the players. It seems only natural to enquire why there is con ict to start with and whether there exist plausible con ict-avoiding agreements in this scenario.
Suppose that there are players, who wish to reach an agreement in , where is the set of non-empty, convex, compact subsets of the utility space, . In case of disagreement, during any point of the negotiation, the payoffs are given by (the solution to) a disagreement game played for the currently available stakes (some subset of Even though this game may be elaborate and may depend on a number of parameters, for our purposes the only relevant information is the relationship between the stakes and the outcome. Hence, we posit the existence of a
Independence of Individually Irrational Alternatives (IIIA): for all , , which assigns a disagreement point, , to every (an therefore, to every non-empty convex, compact subset of That is, if the set of alternatives currently considered were , the outcome of disagreement would be .
It is important to stress that we need not impose any structure on , since it is meant to be a positive description of some real underlying con ict situation and therefore it cannot be freely chosen by the modeler. may depend on additional parameters, especially those related to the players strength , which form part of the description of the con ict game.
A i s a mapping, : , satisfying for all and That is, given the solution selects a non-empty convex, compact subset of the alternatives as acceptable.
De ne . That is, is the subset of which weakly Pareto dominates . Note that, if , then as well.
As long as players act rationally, any solution should weakly Pareto dominate the disagreement outcome, since otherwise at least one player would prefer to provoke disagreement. In other words, from the knowledge that players are rational we can deduce that any agreement on should be a member of the set . Our only assumption is that any eventual agreement on should not be altered if we eliminate all the alternatives that cannot be candidate solutions under individual rationality (i.e. the complement of the set in ).
We thus impose the following axiom on the bargaining solution:
Conceptually, IIIA is much weaker than Nash s Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) axiom, since it only eliminates a subset of his irrelevant alternatives . Imposed on a standard bargaining problem, IIIA would simply eliminate
Proof.
For any there exists a bargaining solution consistent with IIIA.
the alternatives that do not weakly dominate the disagreement point. However, in our context, IIIA has a recursive effect: once we eliminate the individually irrational alternatives, the application of the disagreement function to the remaining set results, in general, in a different disagreement point than before. Consequently, the axiom applies again, eliminating further possible agreements. In fact, as long as is interior to , the application of IIIA keeps generating new smaller and smaller sets of acceptable agreements.
In view of its recursive implications, should we still nd IIIA a plausible axiom?
We certainly think so. The point of all irrelevant alternatives type axioms is to provide some consistency between solutions of the same underlying bargaining situation but with different sets of available agreements. In our view, the appropriate description of the bargaining situation should not be con ned to a xed disagreement point, since the outcome of disagreement is likely to depend on the alternatives available. Therefore, what should be kept xed when carrying out the consistency check is the disagreement function, just as it is done in IIIA. That is, our assumption compares bargaining situations where the same set of players are bargaining in the shadow of the same con ict game but with different sets of feasible utility payoffs.
Our rst result shows that the requirement imposed on the solution is not too stringent. 
For any and for any if satis es IIIA then
The agreement in the shadow of con ict solution (ASC) is , the maximal bargaining solution consistent with IIIA.
Internal Consistency (IC): for all
A further nice property of bargaining solutions satisfying IIIA is that for any bargaining set, the union of all solutions is itself a solution satisfying IIIA, and in fact it is , the solution displayed in the existence proof above.
Suppose otherwise. Then for some is nonempty. By IIIA, using the construction in the proof of Lemma 1, we have that for all However, since for large enough it must be the case that is non-empty. Contradiction.
As a result of Lemma 2, we can meaningfully talk about as the maximal solution satisfying IIIA.
We are now set for the formal de nition of our solution concept.
The increase in the informational content of the description of the bargaining problem together with our axiom is sufficient to provide us with a unique set of acceptable agreements. In general, this set of agreements needs not be a singleton. Whether the solution is determinate or not depends on the nature of the disagreement game. We shall now prove that provided that the solution is internally consistent for disagreement games where at least some of the players can obtain a payoff which is superior to the worst possible agreement for them, the above result can be strengthened: the ASC solution singles out a unique, Pareto efficient agreement.
Internal consistency of the solution simply means that if we apply the bargaining solution to the solution set itself, the solution remains invariant. This axiom is obviously satis ed whenever the solution is a singleton. Intuitively it simply says that if starting from a larger set the solution can only be re ned to then starting from it should not be possible to obtain a more re ned solution, since then the solution from the original set should also get re ned.
The formal requirement we impose on the disagreement function amounts to the following assumption. What do we mean by disagreement over a set whose worse element gives the players more utility than the status quo? We believe that this should be understood as a partial agreement: the players agree to distribute some of the surplus in a certain way, thereby reducing the set over which they disagree. As long as this partial agreement is honored even in case of a later break-up, or con ict, the assumption is as valid as when it is made about the original bargaining set.
We now can reap the bene ts of Assumption 1:
Suppose that is not a singleton. Then, by Assumption 1, dominates some points in . This, together with IIIA implies that , violating IC. Therefore, must be a singleton.
By the construction of the solution in the proof of Lemma 1, each set contains the points of the weak Pareto frontier of that dominate . Therefore, the point is on the frontier of , proving the efficiency of the solution.
Thus, we have shown that whenever the disagreement functions are informative, a mild axiom about the players rationality is sufficient to identify a determinate agreement. The essential point is that by using more information on the player s characteristics, as revealed by the outcomes of the disagreement game, we can dispense with most axioms, except rationality. This argument is similar to how Economics deals with exchange. If we know the supply and demand schedules (at different prices) we can determine the equilibrium price, without having to axiomatize what the just price would be. Let us now enrich the above game by the following. In every period, bargaining (or communication) is only possible with probability (with otherwise the game directly proceeds to the following period.
The motivation for this feature of the model is that in every period, after the For an arbitrary period, we then have
Consequently, in period the unique equilibrium action of a proposer is to propose whenever she is chosen. Thus the period 1 proposals will be and will always be accepted in equilibrium. Therefore the unique expected equilibrium outcome is
We then have the following:
Assumption 2 Note that if we can choose and so that for all recalling that the refer to the sequence of bargaining sets generated in the proof of Proposition 1 then the claim is true. In order for that to hold (c.f.
Equation (1))we need the following relationship to hold (for all and :
Solving for and observing that the must add up to one (for each we have
Solving now for we obtain
Since the convergence is monotonic, an alternative expression of this result is that for any there exists a high enough so that
In the same spirit, if we were to take the set of feasible agreements to be nite (c.f. Stahl 1994), there would be an upper bound on the periods needed for (full)
convergence.
Unfortunately, the proposition does not guarantee that In order to ensure that, we need to make an additional assumption. Recall from the previous proof that we denote the best payoff vector or blisspoint for Player i in by 5 The linear case
Proposition 7
Proof. Note that the assumption simply posits that the efficiency cost of disagreement is sufficiently large so that there exists some lottery over the players blisspoints which Pareto dominates disagreement.
Note that by (3) would imply that the disagreement point is exactly on the hyper-plane de ned by i= 1,2,...,N.
The converse of Proposition 5 holds as well, so that we have a full equivalence between the strategic and axiomatic models:
Let By (1) and the de nition of this implies that and converge to the same limit. To see that such a satis es Assumption 1, note that unless for all this is clearly the case, while otherwise must be a singleton.
In this section we restrict our attention to bargaining situations where the subproblems considered are affine transformations of the original one. In other words, we assume that the bargaining set has a linear Pareto frontier (corresponding to risk neutrality), and that the disagreement function is homogeneous. These simplications render the calculation of ASC easy and it also facilitates its comparison with other solutions. Therefore, in this section we assume that can be written as for some and some in the unit simplex.
We shall also focus on the class of disagreement functions that satisfy the following property:
homogeneous We can now easily compute the ASC solution.
We know that the solution is , where Therefore, to obtain we need only to compute . Note that any set in the sequence satis es , with . By Assumption 3 we have that . Therefore, and the equality in the statement of the Proposition follows immediately.
In order to illustrate the differences between ASC and Nash s solutions, let us examine the case of splitting one euro. The disagreement game is as follows. Whatever the amount of money at stake, , a fraction , , is lost and of the remainder , a fraction goes to each player . It is straightforward that the ASC solution is to give to each player. Clearly, can the equal sharing rule. The Nash solution thus has the unappealing feature that the more destructive the disagreement game is, the closer the solution will be to equal division, irrespective of the relative power of the players. Further, the more biased the disagreement game the greater the discrepancy between the Nash and ASC solutions.
Take now the construction of the Nash solution that is a part of the surplus is shared in proportion to the disagreement payoffs and the remainder according to some other sharing rule, but assume that the parameter is not constrained to coincide with the loss from con ict, rather it can be freely agreed among the players.
It is easy to see that the only situation in which the players would agree is when the other sharing rule coincides with the one which is proportional to the disagreement payoffs, resulting in the entire surplus being shared in those proportions (irrespective Proof.
The non-cooperative implementation revisited
See Binmore (1987a,b) and Binmore et al. (1986) . Wilson (2001) , has obtained the same result in a model with a mediator who makes random proposals.
When the Pareto frontier of is the unit simplex and the disagreement function satis es Assumptions 1 and 3, the bargaining weights corresponding to the ASC solution are
Recall that the asymmetric Nash solution can be characterized as the point on the Pareto frontier where the pair-wise elasticity of this frontier is equal to the corresponding ratio of the bargaining weights.
We the have the following:
When the Pareto frontier is the unit simplex, the marginal rate of substitution is 1, everywhere. Consequently the elasticity of the Pareto frontier is equal at every point to the ratio of the utilities at that point. By Proposition 4, this ratio is equal to the ratio of the disagreement utilities.
Note that the current set-up is equivalent in richness to the one analyzed by Rubinstein (1982) , in the sense that in both models at each step of the process, the pie remaining in dispute decreases at some given proportion. In Rubinstein s
alternating-offer bargaining model the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium yields an agreement as a function of the discount factors and the selection of the rst mover. As the time between offers shrinks to zero this solution converges to the same outcome as the asymmetric Nash solution with bargaining weights and independently of the identity of the rst mover. Assuming that the Pareto frontier is the unit simplex, we have proved a similar result for the ASC solution, without having to resort to taking limits. That is, the ASC solution will exactly coincide with the asymmetric Nash solution, while Rubinstein s does so only 
Corollary 10
In the linear set-up the ASC can be (asymptotically) implemented by the game presented in Section 4, with and via a sequence of partial agreements in an approximate sense.
The linear set-up allows us to improve upon our non-cooperative implementation in two distinct ways. On one hand, we overcome the non-stationary nature of our extensive form (apart from the deadline). That is, the probabilities of a given player making the offer and that bargaining is possible are now constant over time:
Homogeneity of D(.), together with the linear Pareto frontier, implies that the bargaining situation is qualitatively the same following any partial agreement.
Consequently, we can drop the time indices.
The other advantage of the linear set-up is that we can now propose an alternative extensive form game, which has a subgame perfect equilibrium leading to the ASC . Therefore, this game is a better illustration of the motivation provided for the axiomatic solution.
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When the disagreement function is not restricted to be proportional, our model still resembles somewhat a Rubinstein-like model, where the discount rates are not stationary (see Binmore, 1987b, for a detailed discussion of these games). Both models are still equivalent to some asymmetric Nash solution. However, the bargaining weights just as the actual solutions are no longer easily computable. In terms of computability, the ASC solution has a signi cant advantage over the Rubinstein-like one: each step in the calculation of the ASC solution improves the precision of the current estimate, and this precision is known. In contrast, to calculate the subgame-perfect equilibrium of a Rubinstein-like game, one has to work backwards from the solution, trying to end up at the disagreement point. At no point in the process, can one have a precise idea about how good the approximation is.
On the other hand, the ASC is not the only outcome supportable, so this game does not serve as implementation in the classical sense. 23 

Proposition 11
A comparative analysis
It is not crucial for the proposals to be simultaneous.
As long as con ict is strictly inefficient, the players conceding up along the ray leading from the origin to the ASC is a subgame perfect equilibrium path for a sufficiently slow rate of concession.
Endogenous determination of the disagreement point.
Consider the following non-cooperative bargaining game. In each period the players rst simultaneously choose whether to provoke con ict over the current stakes (that is, the part of the surplus that has not yet been conceded). If no one provokes con ict then the players simultaneously make irreversible concessions and the game continues to the following period. The game ends when either con ict is generated, or there remains nothing to distribute.
Note that we can always require that everyone provokes con ict following a deviation, what by the simultaneity will be self-enforcing. Therefore, the only thing to worry about is that not making the current period concession and provoking con ict should not dominate the ASC payoff. However, this can always be avoided by making the required concession sufficiently low, since the loss due to con ict is bounded away from zero.
In this section, we clarify our theory by contrasting it to the most related literature.
i)
In his 1953 paper, Nash proposed a generalization of his original model of 1950.
In this game, known as the variable threat model of bargaining, the players choose threats before the actual bargaining phase, of which they serve as the disagreement point. At rst blush, our model may seem just like Nash s one, with a speci c, well-motivated threat game (like Anbarci et al. 2002) . Actually, however, our contribution goes well beyond that. There are two important differences between the models that we would like to underline:
Step-by-step resolution a) Nash needs to employ an umpire to oblige the players to carry out their threats (in case of disagreement). We do without a party. The underlying reason for this is quite relevant. Nash thinks of the threat phase as one preceding the Nash bargaining game. Therefore, this phase has no interpretation on its own, it is simply a perhaps realistic way to make the bargaining game more detailed.
In contrast, we think of our con ict subgame as one posterior to bargaining. By invoking sequential rationality, we can then analyze the players optimal behavior in that subgame without any additional ommitment device. Apart from the obvious difference in philosophy, the technical difference is also apparent, since in Nash s game by a well-chosen threat (which she would prefer not to carry out) a player can improve her share, without her bluff ever being called. Thus, even if we used our con ict game as the threat game, the equilibria would differ, since the players, in general, would not use a threat that forms part of an equilibrium of the con ict game.
b) When Nash s players generate a disagreement point, he considers the bargaining problem properly de ned and proceeds to its solution (according to his 1950 paper). In contrast, we argue that they have simply arrived at a new bargaining situation, where they might wish to employ different threats than before.
To put it another way: while in the Nash model the demand phase depends on the outcome of the threat phase, in our model the con ict game is supposed to depend on the demands made (when they are not compatible).
ii) . Kalai (1977) introduced the axiom of decomposability. This assumption requires that if we break up the set of available agreements, , into two subsets, and , then using the solution of (either) one of these as a partial agreement to subsequently bargain over the rest, , should give the same result as applying the solution directly. Note that Kalai s model agrees with ours in the idea that partial agreements are only renegotiated if this yields a Pareto improvement. On the other hand, Kalai does not propose a well-de ned solution: he only establishes
Bargaining under the threat of some outside enforcement mechanism.
that the solution should be proportional, without identifying what should these proportions be. In addition, Kalai s model has two caveats, rst pointed out by Ponsati and Watson (1997) . The rst of these is that when agreeing on the rst sub-problem, the bargainers of Kalai are not supposed to take into account the effect of today s agreement on tomorrow s one.This is not true in our model. Second,there seems to be an inconsistency between the assumption that the agreement on the rst subproblem is binding, but at the same time can be renegotiated since the second sub-problem is not but . In our model, however, these two sets coincide so we avoid any confusion. the disagreement function to determine the new status quo and we do not need the arbitrary division. Fearon (1996) proposes a model with ow payoffs where the current distribution of the assets determines the current power in case of (costly) con ict. Assuming one-sided offers, he obtains a unique path of gradually increasing demand.
iii)
This topic has been extensively dealt with in the applied literature (pre-trial negotiations, strikes, arbitration etc.). Perhaps, the piece closest to our approach is Powell (1996) . Powell sets up a non-cooperative bargaining game where the players can choose to force a (probabilistic) settlement at some cost. The important difference with respect to our approach is that, in his model, forcing the settlement is equivalent to taking an outside option. However, outside options do not determine, in general, the outcome of a bargaining game. Therefore, Powell needs to rely on the solution to the bargaining game, which would come about in the absence of outside options. In our case, in contrast, the solution of the game cannot be dissociated
Recursive solutions
Disagreement modelled as a non-cooperative game.
Endogenous bargaining power.
from the underlying con ict situation.
iv) .
We are not the rst ones to use a recursive application of some rule in bargaining theory. Let us mention just a couple. Raiffa (1953) proposes a method where the players rst pocket half of their most preferred allocation, then half of their most preferred allocation in the remainder... etc. While in (its recursive) structure his procedure is very much like ours, the important difference is that he has no justi cation other than some vague consideration of fairness for the fty ercent rule. van Damme (1986) considers a ecursivity axiom, which imposes that if the players are making demands according to some individual theories, then in every step of the iteration, as a function of these demands some subset of S is to be discarded, and the negotiation resumed. Technically, the IIIA assumption is very similar, with the important difference that we only invoke individual rationality for discarding irrelevant alternatives.
v)
Lundberg and Pollak (1993) replace divorce by a non-cooperative equilibrium within marriage, as the disagreement point in a model of marital bargaining. While they implicitly recognize that the forces determining the threat point are the same ones that in uence the bargaining process, they do not make this connection explicit, and simply use the Nash solution.
vi) Spindler (1974 Spindler ( , 1976 proposed a de nition of bargaining power which is not xed, rather it is a function of the agreement considered (and of the status quo).
Then the solution can be calculated as the one which equates these endogenous bargaining powers. While his method is very different from hours, it shares the idea of trying to read more out of the bargaining situation than Nash s bargaining set.
Concluding remarks agreement disagreement
In this paper we have presented a new approach to the theory of negotiation and have introduced the corresponding agreement concept. The cornerstone of our theory is the more efficient use of information that was already necessary for the standard theory: the description of the non-cooperative resolution of con ict. Indeed, we use not only the utility allocation in a particular equilibrium (the disagreement point), but we make full use of the primitives behind this equilibrium. In fact,
we have shown that the disagreement function contains sufficient information to derive a unique agreement when coupled with a mild generalization of individual rationality.
We consider our theory to be complementary to the one based on time preferences. In scenarios where delay costs (and the risk of breakdown) are negligible with respect to the stakes of negotiation, like political disputes; or where disagreement leads into con ict which generates inefficiencies that are not related to delay, our approach seems to be more appropriate. In addition, the ASC solution yields a unique solution for an arbitrary number of negotiators, while the alternating-offers models usually generate multiple equilibria for more than two players.
Our theory carries with it a conceptual novelty as well. This insight relates to the interpretation of the terms: and . Recall that the general idea of offer-counteroffer models is that disagreement is temporary in the sense that the rejection of an offer does not end the negotiation and that agreement is total in the sense that at each point in time the players are either in agreement or not, no intermediate possibility is considered. Instead, we make the dual assumption: we posit that disagreement is nal but possibly partial, while agreements can be temporary, and therefore partial as well. That is, we allow for the possibility that the players agree on the sharing of part of the surplus and either postpone agreement or disagree on the rest. The important observation is that the fact that they did not get to full agreement is not interpreted as a complete failure 24 24 Until recently (see Sákovics (2004)) it was thought that for two-player games no (meaningful) such solution was possible at all.
of the negotiation: the partial agreement can be implemented and the extent (and the efficiency cost) of disagreement is reduced.
To appreciate the degree of the meta-similarity of the dual approaches, note that our enrichment of the bargaining problem with the disagreement function merely corresponds to the incorporation of an exogenous cost of disagreement over the surplus remaining, conditional on any partial agreement. This is completely parallel to the case where the description of the bargaining problem is augmented with the exogenous parameters of the cost of (temporary) disagreement to each party following any length of past disagreement. Similarly, our ruling out of a trivial disagreement game corresponds to Rubinstein s ruling out perfectly patient players.
Finally, in both cases the sequential story behind the solution is not meant to be actually followed in real time. Rational, fully informed agents will immediately identify which is the unique solution.
Finally, we should emphasize that we have presented our model based on cardinal preferences only to minimize our departure from standard theory. It is easy to see that we need not restrict attention to the utility space in order to derive our solution. Any underlying space of bargaining outcomes, together with a complete preference relation, would suffice. In other words, our theory is one based on ordinal preferences, an elusive goal for solutions to the standard bargaining problem. 
